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Abstract
Inhibitory control can be triggered directly via the retrieval of previously acquired stimulus-
stop associations from memory. However, a recent study suggests that this item-specific stop 
learning may be mediated via expectancies of the contingencies in play (Best, Lawrence, 
Logan, McLaren, & Verbruggen, 2016). This could indicate that stimulus-stop learning also 
induces strategic, proactive changes in performance. We further tested this hypothesis in the 
present study. In addition to measuring expectancies following task completion, we intro-
duced a between-subjects expectancy manipulation in which one group of participants were 
informed about the stimulus-stop contingencies and another group did not receive any 
information about the stimulus-stop contingencies. Moreover, we combined this instruction 
manipulation with a distractor manipulation that was previously used to examine strategic 
proactive adjustments. We found that the stop-associated items slowed responding in both 
conditions. Furthermore, participants in both conditions generated expectancies following 
task completion that were consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies. The distractor 
manipulation was ineffective. However, we found differences in the relationship between the 
expectancy ratings and task performance: in the instructed condition, the expectancies 
reliably correlated with the response slowing for the stop-associated items, whereas in the 
uninstructed condition we found no reliable correlation. These differences between the 
correlations were reliable, and our conclusions were further supported by Bayesian analyses. 
We conclude that stimulus-stop associations that are acquired either via task instructions or 
via task practice have similar effects on behavior but could differ in how they elicit response 
slowing. 
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‘Response inhibition’ is often considered to be one of the core executive control functions, 
and the concept has been linked to flexible and adaptive behavior in healthy and clinical 
populations (e.g. Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Miyake et al., 2000; Ridderinkhof, 
van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). However, 
our previous work suggests that stopping in go/no-go and stop-signal tasks can be ‘automatic-
ally’ triggered by the retrieval of instances or episodes from memory (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008b; for a review, see Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren, 2014), without 
much involvement of ‘top-down’ control mechanisms. 
In the go/no-go paradigm, participants respond when a go stimulus is presented and 
withhold their response when a no-go stimulus is presented. In the stop-signal paradigm, 
participants usually perform a choice reaction-time task on no-signal trials; on a random 
selection of trials, a stop signal (e.g. an auditory tone or an extra visual cue) is presented after 
a variable delay (stop-signal delay; SSD) which instructs participants to withhold their 
response to the go stimulus. Several studies have manipulated the consistency of the mapping 
between specific stimuli and stopping in these response-inhibition tasks. These studies have 
demonstrated that, following a training phase, responding is typically slower for old stop-
associated stimuli compared with consistent go stimuli (always presented on no-signal trials), 
inconsistent stimuli (presented on no-signal and stop-signal trials with equal probability), or 
with new stimuli (not previously presented; e.g. Best, Lawrence, Logan, McLaren, Verbrug-
gen, 2016; Bowditch, Verbruggen & McLaren, 2016; Chiu, Aron, & Verbruggen, 2012; 
Liefooghe, Degryse, Theeuwes, 2016; Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008b). At least in some paradigms, this slowing can be attributed to the retrieval of 
associations between specific stimuli and the stop ‘goal’ or ‘response’, such that the stimulus 
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(e.g. ‘apple’) or stimulus category (e.g. ‘fruit’) becomes associated with stopping (cf. Logan, 
1988). When the stimulus (or category) is repeated, the stimulus-stop association is retrieved, 
interfering with responding on no-signal trials. Thus, response inhibition is not necessarily an 
entirely instruction-based (e.g. ‘stop when an extra signal occurs’) act of executive control, it 
can also be triggered by the direct retrieval of a ‘stop response’ from memory (even when it is 
not required or intended at a given moment). 
The ‘automatic1 inhibition’ account states that after stimulus-specific stop training the 
need for rule- or instruction-based control is reduced and may eventually disappear altogether 
as control is triggered ‘bottom-up’ following stimulus presentation (see also e.g. Chein & 
Schneider, 2012). In some situations, however, slowing for old stop words could also be 
caused by anticipatory processes. One of the main functions of the control system is biasing 
competition between stimulus or response options on the basis of expectancy or rules. When 
a certain action is predicted, for example, the motor network is pre-activated, biasing action 
selection and reducing the latency of the anticipated action (e.g. Bestmann, 2012; Meyer & 
Kieras, 1997; but see also Verbruggen, McAndrew, Weidemann, Stevens, & McLaren, 2016). 
Consistent with this idea, we recently found that response slowing for old stop-associated 
items may have been mediated via expectancies of the stimulus-stop contingencies in play 
(Best et al., 2016; Best & Verbruggen, under review). Following task completion, participants 
were required to rate how much they expected to withhold their response to each of the 
stimuli presented in the task. We found correlations between the expectancy ratings and 
response slowing in some of these experiments. This suggests that expectancies generated on 
the basis of the acquired stimulus-stop mappings may contribute to response slowing. After 
1 ‘Automaticity’ in this account is defined on the basis of Instance Theory (Logan, 1988). In 
this theory, performance was considered to be ‘automatic’ when it was based on the retrieval 
of previous instances or episodes from memory. 
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all, previous work shows that when instructions at the beginning of a block or a cue at the 
beginning of a trial indicate that a no-go or stop signal may appear, participants tend to 
proactively adjust attentional settings, increase response thresholds, or proactively suppress 
motor output to enhance detection of no-go or stop signals and prevent premature go 
responses (e.g. Aron, 2011; Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016; Jahfari, 
Stinear, Claffey, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a; Verbruggen, 
Stevens, & Chambers, 2014; Zandbelt, Bloemendaal, Neggers, Kahn, & Vink, 2012). Our 
expectancy results (Best et al., 2016) suggest that stop-associated stimuli could become such 
stop cues (e.g. ‘if stimulus X then p(stop) is high’). In this case, the slowing observed for old 
stop-associated items could be due to deliberate proactive strategy adjustments of attentional, 
response-selection, or motor settings in the go task rather than suppression of motor output 
via the direct retrieval of stimulus-stop associations (i.e. stimulus X = stop). 
Evidence for the involvement of proactive-strategy adjustments in stop-training tasks 
would have two important implications. First, it would contradict the idea that inhibitory 
control is always fully ‘automatised’ after practice in stop-training tasks. Second, it would 
have important practical implications as it could shed a new light on findings in the applied 
inhibition-training domain. Studies of this type suggest that the acquisition of stimulus-stop 
associations could be an effective way to reduce engagement in impulsive and compulsive 
behaviors, such as excessive unhealthy food intake (e.g., Adams, Lawrence, Verbruggen, & 
Chambers, 2016; Houben, 2011; Houben & Jansen, 2011; Lawrence et al., 2015a, 2015b; 
Veling, Aarts, & Papies, 2011; Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2012) and alcohol consumption (e.g., 
Houben, Nederkoorn, Wiers & Jansen, 2011; Jones & Field, 2013; for meta-analyses, see 
Allom, Mullan, & Hagger, 2015; Jones et al., 2016). Our previous expectancy findings (Best 
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et al., 2016) indicate that the effects of inhibition training could be more strategic than 
initially thought. 
The ‘direct activation’ (i.e. the stop process is directly activated by the retrieval of 
stimulus-stop associations) and ‘strategic proactive adjustment’ (i.e. go processing is 
proactively adjusted when the probability of a stop signal is deemed high) accounts both 
predict increased reaction times (RTs) for old stop items. One way to assess whether 
participants proactively adjust response strategies for old stop items is to question them at the 
end of the experiment (as in Best et al., 2016). However, measuring knowledge of rules, 
expectancies, or strategies at the end of the experiment has limitations (Newell & Shanks, 
2014; Shanks, 2010). Newell and Shanks (2014) proposed four criteria for the assessment of 
awareness: (1) reliability (the assessment should not be affected by factors that did not also 
affect behavioural performance); (2) relevance (assessments should only target information 
relevant to the behaviour in question); (3) sensitivity (assessments should be made under 
optimal conditions, such as using the same cues as in the task); and (4) immediacy (the 
assessment should be made during behaviour or immediately afterwards). Whilst assessing 
expectancies at the end of task performance might meet the first three criteria, it is certainly 
sub-optimal that expectancies were obtained after learning had taken place. However, asking 
participants to provide an expectancy rating at the beginning of each trial (as in Best et al., 
2016, Experiment 4) could change the nature of the task, and may ‘push’ participants towards 
strategic adjustments in anticipation of a signal. Therefore, in the present study, we used a 
complementary approach to assess the contribution of strategic proactive adjustments that did 
not require participants to provide a trial-by-trial expectancy rating. In addition to measuring 
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expectancy ratings at the end of the experiment, we used a distractor manipulation to further 
determine how slowing to the stop-associated items is achieved. 
Verbruggen, Stevens, and Chambers (2014) introduced perceptual (visual) distractors to 
measure reactive and (strategic) proactive control during performance of a stop-signal task. In 
their version of the task, there were three block types: central-signal blocks (a visual stop 
signal could occur in the centre of the screen), non-central signal blocks (a visual stop signal 
could occur in the periphery), and no-signal blocks (no stop signals could occur). Moreover, 
they presented random two-letter strings as visual distractors on a random 50% of trials. This 
created a trade-off in non-central blocks: strategic proactive adjustments involved the 
widening of attentional focus to detect stop signals in the periphery whereas interference 
control required the narrowing of focus to avoid processing the distractors. These opposing 
demands produced a larger distractor effect2 on no-signal trials in non-central signal blocks 
than on no-signal trials in the two other block types. 
In the present study, we used the same non-central signals (i.e. visual stop signals that 
occurred in the periphery of the screen) and distractor manipulation (random two-letter 
strings) to examine if strategic proactive-control adjustments were made for stop-associated 
items. We reasoned that if stop-associated items become cues for strategic proactive-control 
adjustments, participants would proactively widen their attention in order to detect the stop 
signal in the periphery. As shown in Verbruggen, Stevens et al. (2014), widening of attention 
would, in turn, result in greater processing of the distractor stimulus and thus increase the size 
of the distractor effect (in analogy with the block-based differences observed in Verbruggen, 
Stevens, et al. (2014)). In contrast, the ‘direct activation’ account does not predict a widening 
2 Performance on distractor trials minus performance on no-distractor trials.
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of attention as the stop-associated items would directly activate the stop goal and so parti-
cipants would not need to rely on the stop signal as a cue to stop their response. Thus, 
according to the direct activation account, there would be no widening of attention and so no 
change in the size of the distractor effect between items consistently associated with stopping 
and items consistently associated with going or associated with both going and stopping.
A pilot study (reported in Supplementary Materials) showed that words frequently 
associated with stopping did not display a larger distractor effect than words rarely or never 
associated with stopping. As noted in the previous paragraph, the ‘strategic proactive-control 
adjustment’ account predicts that items frequently associated with stopping should lead to a 
more pronounced widening of attention (as reflected by an increased distractor effect) 
compared with items never or rarely associated with stopping. There was no evidence of this 
data pattern in the pilot study. Thus, these findings argue against the ‘strategic proactive-
control adjustment’ account. However, on the basis of the pilot study, it is not possible to 
determine whether participants did not make strategic proactive adjustments to their attention 
or whether the distractor manipulation did not detect such adjustments. In the main study, we 
therefore decided to combine the distractor manipulation (used in the pilot study) with a 
between-subjects instruction manipulation that was designed to increase strategic proactive-
control adjustments in one group of participants. In the “instructed” group, participants were 
shown a list of the words frequently associated with stopping at the beginning of each block 
and were explicitly informed that these words were more likely to occur with a stop signal 
than other words in the task. The reasoning was that, if any strategic proactive-control 
adjustments occur at all, they should be more pronounced in the instructed group (as 
measured by a larger distractor effect for these ‘stop-associated’ words) compared with the 
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other group that did not receive any information about the stop-associated words, and so 
acquired these associations through task practice alone (as in the pilot study). In other words, 
we expected that the stop-associated words in the instructed condition would act like 
instructed cues (as in other studies that examined proactive-strategy adjustments; e.g. Aron, 
2011; Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016; Jahfari, Stinear, Claffey, 
Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a; Zandbelt, Bloemendaal, Neggers, 
Kahn, & Vink, 2012). Thus, by contrasting performance in the instructed group with 
performance in an uninstructed group (in which participants were not told about the stimulus-
stop contingencies) we could test how the acquisition of instructed and uninstructed stimulus-
stop contingencies influenced performance in a stop-signal task.
Furthermore, in addition to the instruction manipulation, we also obtained expectancy 
ratings at the end of the experiment (unlike in the pilot study). By comparing the correlation 
between these ratings and performance in both conditions, we also hoped to out more about 
how instructions and learning based on practice alone would influence performance.
The present study
In the present study, we manipulated task instructions and perceptual distractors to investigate 
how expectancies influence learning in a stop-signal task and so distinguish the contributions 
of strategic proactive adjustments and the direct retrieval of the stop goal.
The main design 
On each trial, a large square and a fixation signal were presented in the middle of the screen 
(Figure 1). After a delay, a single word appeared in the centre of the square. Participants had 
to decide whether the word referred to a natural or human-made object. On stop-signal trials, 
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the lines of the surrounding square became thicker (i.e. the stop signal), instructing the 
participants to stop their response. There were three word types in this experiment: 80%-stop 
words (on 80% of trials where this particular word type was presented, a stop signal was 
presented); 20%-stop words (on 20% of trials where this particular word type was presented, 
a stop signal was presented); and 0%-stop words (only occurred on no-signal trials). The 
80%-stop words, 20%-stop words, and 0%-stop words remained the same throughout the 
experiment.
To contrast the ‘direct activation’ and ‘strategic proactive adjustment’ accounts, we 
presented visual distractors to determine if slowing was (at least partly) due to strategic, 
proactive changes in attentional settings. In addition, we directly manipulated contingency 
knowledge via task instructions (between-subjects). In the instructed condition, participants 
were presented with a list of the 80%-stop words at the beginning of each block; in the 
uninstructed condition, participants received no information about the stimulus-stop 
contingencies. In the instructed condition, participants received no information about the 
20%-stop and 0%-stop words, although it is possible that our instruction manipulation might 
have influenced more general knowledge about the existence of associations within the task 
(Gaschler, Marewski, Wenke, & Frensch, 2014). We return to this issue in the General 
Discussion. 
We also examined how performance changed across the task. Instruction following is 
implemented via a fast prefrontal (indirect) route that links stimuli and responses whereas 
practice-based learning would be implemented via a slower (direct) route that includes 
stimulus areas, response areas, and the basal ganglia (e.g. Chein & Schneider, 2012; 
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Ramamoorthy & Verguts, 2012). Therefore we examined how performance changed over 
three experiment parts. 
The predictions 
We used a ‘triangulation’ approach to distinguish between the ‘direct activation’ and 
‘strategic proactive adjustment’ accounts. 
First, we predicted that responding on no-signal trials would be slower and the probability 
of responding on stop-signal trials would be lower for the 80%-stop words compared with the 
other the word types across both the instructed and uninstructed conditions. Furthermore, if 
the 80%-stop words elicited extreme slowing or outright stopping we would detect this as a 
higher probability of missed responses on no-signal trials for the 80%-stop words than for the 
other word types. We further predicted that the slowing for the 80%-stop words would be 
especially pronounced in the instructed condition (as reflected in a reliable two-way interac-
tion between word type and condition). Thus, more pronounced slowing for the 80%-stop 
words in the instructed than in the non-instructed condition would show that participants in 
both conditions were influenced by the stimulus-stop associations in play and also provide a 
critical manipulation check that participants in the instructed condition used the instructed 
expectancies during task performance. 
Second, stimulus-stop learning does not seem to modulate attentional processes much 
when visuospatial stop signals are used (Best & Verbruggen, under review) whereas proactive 
control adjustments do seem to modulate attentional processes (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 
2014; see also e.g. Elchlepp et al., 2016; Schevernels et al., 2015). Thus, the distractor effect 
(as measured in RTs) would be larger for the 80%-stop words than for the other word types if 
participants made strategic proactive adjustments (similar to the non-central vs. control 
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blocks in Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). As strategic proactive adjustments seemed more 
likely in the instructed condition than in the uninstructed condition, we also predicted a 
reliable three-way interaction between word type, condition, and distractor. Importantly, the 
absence of a reliable three-way interaction in combination with the presence of a reliable 
two-way interaction between distractor and word type would indicate that strategic proactive 
adjustments were made in both instruction conditions. 
Third, we hypothesised that the slowing (or even outright stopping, as reflected in 
increased probability of missed responses on no-signal trials and decreased probability of 
responding on stop-signal trials) to the stop-associated words in the uninstructed condition 
would emerge with task practice. This would reflect the acquisition of the stimulus-stop 
associations through learning. In contrast, as participants in the instructed condition were 
shown a list of the words frequently associated with stopping at the beginning of each block, 
we predicted that slowing or outright stopping to the stop-associated items in the instructed 
condition would be present across task practice (but could get stronger across task practice if 
additional learning took place). Thus, we analysed how task performance changed across 
three parts. Importantly, if the difference between the instructed and uninstructed groups is 
only due to the rate of learning (as discussed above), our effects should also be modulated by 
part. More specifically, the effect of word type would differ in the two conditions at the 
beginning of the task but not towards the end of the task. 
Finally, at the end of the experiment, we obtained an expectancy rating for each of the 
words presented in the task. We predicted that participants would expect to stop more to the 
80%-stop words than the other word types following task completion, especially in the 
instructed condition. This would reflect the acquisition of the stimulus-stop expectancies 
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instructed at the beginning of each block in the instructed condition. We further hypothesised 
that the expectancy ratings would correlate with the slowing for the 80%-stop words during 
task performance in the instructed condition, showing the slowing to be driven (in part) by 
strategic adjustments to task performance on the basis of the acquisition or formation of 
expectancies. Thus, a correlation between slowing for the 80%-stop words and expectancy 
would provide evidence for the ‘strategic proactive adjustment’ account. Since the ‘direct 
activation’ account predicts that slowing for the 80%-stop words would be driven by direct 
activation of the stop goal from memory, we hypothesised that there would be no correlation 
between the expectancy ratings and the slowing for the 80%-stop words in the uninstructed 
condition. However, if the 80%-stop words acted as similar stop expectancy ‘cues’, we 
should see a similar positive correlation in the uninstructed condition. 
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Figure 1: The distractor stop task. A word was presented in the middle of a square. Parti-
cipants had to judge whether the word referred to a human-made or a natural object. On half 
of the trials (distractor trials), random two-letter strings appeared at random locations every 
100 ms. On some trials (stop-signal trials), the square turned bold after a variable delay from 
the onset of the word, instructing the participants to withhold their response. For display 
purposes, foreground and background colours are switched in this figure. In the present study, 
white stimuli appeared against a black background.
Experiments 
There were two experiments. In Experiment 1, we encouraged fast responding using a strict 
response deadline (1250 ms). We also obtained eye-movement data as an additional depend-
ent variable to detect within-trial shifts of attentional focus. However, the probability of 
missed no-signal responses (M = 0.050, SD = 0.066) was higher than in our previous study 
(Best et al., 2016), including for items that were not associated with stopping. This indicates 
that the response deadline was too strict. Therefore, we ran another experiment in which we 
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extended the response deadline (2000 ms) to reduce the probability of missed responses. To 
ensure that the overall task duration was comparable across experiments, we did not obtain 
eye-movement data in Experiment 2. After all, the eye movement data of Experiment 1 did 
not substantially add to the information provided by the behavioral data (Supplementary 
Materials; this is consistent with Best & Verbruggen, under review; Verbruggen, Stevens, et 
al., 2014). Note that the overall study set-up remained the same.
Initial analyses revealed that whilst the probability of missed no-signal responses was 
reduced in Experiment 2 (and the no-signal reaction times numerically increased) the overall 
pattern of results (i.e. interactions between word types, distractor types, and instruction 
conditions) was consistent across both experiments. Therefore, we combined the data of both 
experiments as this increased the overall power (for completeness, we present the separate 
analyses for the experiments in the Supplementary Materials).
Method
Participants. 120 volunteers (48 in Experiment 1 and 72 in Experiment 2) from the 
University of Exeter participated for monetary compensation (£8) or partial course credit (M 
= 19.88 years, SD = 3.05, 98 females, 109 right-handed). Two participants were replaced 
because the percentage of correct no-signal trials was below 70% (this exclusion criterion 
was based on an earlier pilot study; for details, see Supplementary Materials) and three 
participants in Experiment 1 were replaced due to poor calibration of the eye-tracker in one 
or more task blocks. 
The experiments were approved by the local research ethics committee (School of 
Psychology, University of Exeter). Each participant provided informed consent after the 
INSTRUCTED AND ACQUIRED CONTINGENCIES 16
nature and possible consequences of the study was explained. The target sample size and 
exclusion criteria were decided in advance of data collection for each experiment to ensure 
that we had enough power (0.80) to detect small-to-medium sized effects (f = 0.20) in the 
word type by condition interactions. A power calculation was performed using G*Power 3.1 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2009). Participants were randomly assigned to between-
subjects groups.
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiments were run using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). 
The stimuli were presented on a 17-in CRT monitor (screen size: 1024 × 768 pixels) in 
Experiment 1 and a 21-in iMac (screen size: 1920 × 1080) in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, 
an EyeLink 1000 Desktop Mount camera system (SR Research, Ottawa, Canada), calibrated 
before each block, tracked the gaze position of the right eye during the whole block.
The stimuli consisted of a large square (350 × 350 pixels) and a word in white lowercase 
font (Courier 16 point) on a black background (Figure 1). The stimuli were presented in the 
centre of the screen. We created a list of 50 four-letter words (see Supplementary Materials), 
which could refer to natural or human-made objects. The experiment consisted of three parts, 
with five blocks per part. Each word was presented twice per block (1x with and 1x without 
distractors). There were three different word types: 80%-stop words (10 words; on 80% of the 
trials, a stop signal was presented); 20%-stop words (30 words; on 20% of the trials, a stop 
signal was presented); and 0%-stop words (10 words; these words could only occur on no-
signal trials). There were more 20%-stop words than 80%-stop words to keep the overall 
probability of stop-signal trials low (0.28; see also Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). Words were 
counterbalanced over conditions between participants. 
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Procedure. On each trial, the square and a fixation signal were presented in the middle of 
the screen. After 250 ms, the word replaced the fixation signal in the centre of the square. 
Half of the participants pressed the ‘c’ key (with their left index finger) when the word 
referred to a natural object, and the ‘m’ key (with their right index finger) when the word 
referred to a human-made object. This mapping was reversed for the other participants. On 
50% of the trials, twenty two-letter randomly generated uppercase strings appeared in random 
locations within the square (distractor trials; Figure 1). To avoid overlap between these 
distractors and words, the centre of the distractors was outside a smaller central region (100 × 
50 pixels). New distractors were presented in different locations every 100ms throughout the 
duration of the trial. Participants had to ignore the distractors. 
On stop-signal trials, the outer square turned bold (1 to 3 pixels) after a variable SSD, 
instructing participants to withhold their response. The stop signal occurred equally often on 
distractor and on non-distractor trials. The SSD for 20%-stop words was initially set at 500 
ms and was continuously adjusted to obtain a probability of successful stopping of 0.50: the 
SSD decreased by 50 ms following an unsuccessful stop-signal trial, but increased by 50 ms 
following a successful stop. We used two separate one-up/one-down tracking procedures for 
distractor and no-distractor trials. The SSD for the 80%-stop words was yoked to the SSD for 
the corresponding 20%-stop words. 
After the response deadline elapsed (1250 ms in Experiment 1; 2000 ms in Experiment 2) 
we presented feedback (on no-signal trials: ‘correct’, ‘incorrect’, or ‘not quick enough’ in 
case the participant did not respond before the end of the trial; on stop-signal trials: ‘correct 
stop’ or ‘failed stop’), which remained on the screen for 500 ms. The feedback was presented 
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to encourage fast and accurate responding. The next trial started immediately after the 
feedback. 
Stimulus-stop contingency knowledge was manipulated between-subjects. Participants in 
the instructed condition were presented with a 10-item list of the 80%-stop words on the 
screen at the beginning of each block and were instructed ‘For certain words, the lines of the 
surrounding square will become thicker (indicating that you have to withhold your response) 
more often than for other words. These words are listed below’. The stimulus-stop contingen-
cies remained the same throughout the whole experiment so the same list was presented at the 
beginning of each block. No information about the 20%-stop and 0%-stop words was 
provided. At the beginning of each block, participants were instructed to remember as many 
of the words as possible. Once participants had done so, they pressed the ‘s’ key to move on 
to the next screen. There was no deadline on the word list screens. Participants in the 
uninstructed condition were not provided with any information about the stimulus-stop 
contingencies at the beginning of the blocks; the instruction screen simply said that they had 
to press the ‘s’ key to start the first trial. At the end of each block, we presented as feedback to 
the participants in both groups their mean RT on no-signal trials, the number of no-signal 
errors, the number of missed no-signal responses, and the percentage of failed stops.
Following completion of the experimental task, each word was again presented. The order 
of the words was randomised anew for each participant. Participants were asked to rate ‘how 
much do you expect to withhold your response when this word is presented?’ on a scale 
between 1 ('I definitely do not think this word indicates that I have to withhold my response') 
and 9 ('I definitely think this word indicates that I have to withhold my response'). There was 
no response deadline for the expectancy ratings. 
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Analyses. All data processing and analyses were completed using R (R Development 
Core Team, 2014). All data files and R scripts are deposited in the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/kydw6/?view_only=131cbcc73fce4abfbfc34375819ecaad).
To determine how learning and the presentation of the distractors influenced go perform-
ance, we analysed mean RT of correct no-signal trials. We also analysed the proportion of 
missed no-signal trials as a measure of outright stopping and/or extreme slowing (missed/
(correct+incorrect+missed)). Proportion of incorrect trials ((incorrect/(correct+incorrect); see 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b) was only analysed for completeness, as we did not have any 
strong predictions about how learning or distractors could influence error rates (e.g. in 
learning did not affect error rates much in Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b; similarly, distractors 
did not influence error rates much in Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). To determine if 
learning influenced stopping performance, we analysed the probability of responding on stop-
signal trials (p(respond|signal)) as the same SSD was used for 20% and 80% items (see also 
Best et al., 2016; Bowditch, Verbruggen, et al., 2016; Noël, Brevers, et al., 2016). 
Performance was analysed with ANOVAs as a function of ‘part’ (part: 1 = blocks 1-5; 2 = 
blocks 6-10; 3 = blocks 11-15), word type (80%-, 20%-, 0%-stop words), distractor type 
(distractor, no distractor), and instruction condition (instructed, uninstructed). As there were a 
high number of (possible) tests in the ANOVAs, we corrected the alpha level using the 
sequential Bonferroni procedure to correct for multiplicity (Cramer, et al., 2016). Where 
appropriate, we applied the Huyhn-Feldt correction for violations of sphericity. For pairwise 
comparisons, Hedge’s gav is the reported effect size measure (Lakens, 2013). 
For the no-signal RT analyses, we calculated Bayes factors for all main effects and 
interaction contrasts in the ANOVA design (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012). 
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We calculated these with the BayesFactor package in R, using the default prior (0.707; 
Morey, Rouder, & Jamil, 2015). We used a top-down approach to reduce the number of 
model comparisons. Top-down model comparisons investigate the effect of removing each 
fixed factor and interaction from the overall model, such that the removal of meaningful 
factors or interactions will have a deleterious effect on the model fit whereas the removal of 
non-meaningful factors or interactions will not.
Descriptive statistics appear in Figures 2–5. Inferential statistics appear in Tables 1–3. 
Exploratory analyses of the eye-tracking data of Experiment 1 and the behavioural analyses 
for each experiment separately are presented in the Supplementary Materials.
Results 
No-signal analyses. 
Reaction times on correct no-signal trials. Figure 2 shows correct RTs on no-signal trials 
for each condition, word type, distractor type, and part. Consistent with our predictions, we 
found a main effect of word type (p < 0.001; Table 1), and an interaction between condition 
and word type (p < 0.001; Table 1): the word-type effect was more pronounced in the 
instructed condition than in the uninstructed condition (Figure 2). Follow-up tests revealed 
that, as predicted, RTs on no-signal trials in the instructed condition were longer for the 80%-
stop words (933 ms) than for the 0%-stop words (863 ms), t(59) = 10.17, p < 0.001, gav = 
0.34, BF10 = 519120863260 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.0013), and for the 20%-stop 
words (874 ms), t(59) = 9.34, p < 0.001, gav = 0.29, BF10 = 25543245982 (one-tailed direc-
3 Based on previous evidence of stimulus-stop learning, we made strong predictions about the 
direction of this effect. No differences between word types or differences in the opposite 
direction (i.e. shorter RTs or lower p(miss) for 80% words than for 0% and 20% words) 
would argue against stimulus-stop associations. Therefore, we report both the two-tailed p-
values and the p-values of one-directional t-tests. 
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tional t-test: p < 0.001). The difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words 
was also reliable, t(59) = -5.10, p < 0.001, gav = -0.05, BF10 = 4510.62 (one-tailed directional 
t-test: p < 0.001). In the uninstructed condition, RTs on no-signal trials were longer for the 
80%-stop words (921 ms) than for the 0%-stop words (900 ms), t(59) = 4.87, p < 0.001, gav = 
0.10, BF10 = 2095.25 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.001), and for the 20%-stop words 
(902 ms), t(59) = 4.71, p < 0.001, gav = 0.09, BF10 = 1197.50 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 
0.001). The difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words was not reliable, 
t(59) = -1.14, p = 0.261, gav = -0.01 (one-tailed directional t-test: p = 0.130), BF10 = 0.264. The 
correlations between the slowing for the 80%-stop words and the expectancy ratings in the 
instructed and uninstructed conditions will be discussed below (see ‘Expectancy analyses).
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, the slowing for the stop-associated words become 
numerically larger across task practice in both the instructed and uninstructed conditions 
indicating that learning took place in both conditions. Note, however, that the two-way 
interaction between word type and part and the three-way interaction between word type, part 
and condition did not survive correction for multiplicity.
Consistent with the earlier Verbruggen, Stevens et al. (2014) study, we found a main effect 
of distractor type (p < 0.001; Table 1). Importantly, however, there was no reliable difference 
in the magnitude of the distractor effect between conditions (p = 0.270; Table 1). Crucially, 
there was no reliable two-way interaction between word type and distractor type (p = 0.349; 
4 To explore the difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words we repeated 
the main analysis excluding the 80%-stop words. This showed that the two-way interaction 
between condition and word type was reliable, F(1, 118) = 7.12, p = 0.009, gen. η2 < 0.001, 
reflecting the larger RT differences between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words in 
the instructed condition than in the uninstructed condition. Furthermore, the three way 
interaction between condition, word type and part was also reliable, F(2, 236) = 3.07, p = 
0.047, gen. η2 < 0.001: the numerical difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-
stop words became larger as a function of part in the instructed condition but became smaller 
as a function of part in the uninstructed condition. 
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Table 1), nor a reliable three-way interaction between condition, word type, and distractor 
type (p = 0.447; Table 1). These conclusions were further supported by the Bayesian 
analyses. As can be seen in Table 2, the results are largely consistent with the ANOVAs 
reported in Table 1. The Bayesian analyses showed that dropping word type, distractor type, 
part, and the two-way interaction between condition and word type had a deleterious effect 
on the model. Importantly, the two-way interaction between word type and distractor type 
and the three-way interaction between condition, word type, and distractor type could be 
dropped. These analyses provide further support for the conclusion that the distractor effect 
was similar across the word types. 
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Figure 2: Reaction times on correct no-signal trials for the instructed condition (left panels) 
and for the uninstructed condition as a function of part (1-3), word type (0%-stop, 20%-stop 
or 80%-stop words) and distractor type (distractor, no-distractor). Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Table 1: Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the no-signal trial data. 
Condition is included as a between-subjects factor, all other factors are within-subjects. In the 
no-signal trial RT analysis, incorrect, and missed no-signal trials were removed. αad = alpha-
level following the sequential Bonferroni procedure to control for multiplicity. ps < αadj are 
highlighted in bold.
Table 2: no-signal trial RT Bayesian analysis. Bayes factors < 1 indicate that the removal of 
the factor or interaction had a deleterious effect on the model, whereas Bayes factors > 1 
indicate that the factor or interaction could be removed without impairing the fit much. Note 
that ‘participant’ was included as a factor for all models, but this factor is not added to the 
model descriptions in the tables to reduce the amount of text. distract = distractor type (no-
distractor, distractor); type = word type.
Probability of a missed go response. Figure 3 shows the p(miss) data. We found a main 
effect of word type (p < 0.001; Table 1) and a reliable two-way interaction between condition 
and word type (p < 0.001; Table 1). Follow up tests revealed that there was a main effect of 
word type in the instructed condition (p < 0.001): p(miss) in the instructed condition was 
higher for the 80%-stop words (0.051) than for the 0%-stop words (0.026), t(59) = 4.43, p < 
0.001, gav = 0.58, BF10 = 493.45 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.001), and for the 20%-stop 
words (0.025), t(59) = 4.43, p < 0.001, gav = 0.61, BF10 = 495.29 (one-tailed directional t-test: 
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p < 0.001). There was no reliable main effect of word type in the uninstructed condition (p = 
0.224). 
P(miss) was higher on distractor trials than on no-distractor trials (p < 0.001; Table 1). 
However, the two-way interaction between word type and distractor type was not reliable (p 
= 0.760; Table 1) and the three-way interaction between condition, word type, and distractor 
type did not survive after correction for multiplicity (p = 0.007; Table 1).
Combined, these results suggest that the instructed stimulus-stop associations increased 
outright stopping (or induced extreme slowing) following the presentation of stop-associated 
words even when a go response was required. However, there was no evidence that the 
distractor effect varied across word types, thus replicating the results for RTs on no-signal 
trials. 
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Figure 3: The probability of missed go responses for the instructed condition (left panels) 
and for the uninstructed condition as a function of part (1-3), word type (0%-stop, 20%-stop 
or 80%-stop words) and distractor type (distractor, no-distractor). Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Probability of an incorrect go response. Figure 4 shows the p(error) data. Exploratory 
analyses of the p(error) data revealed a reliable main effect of word type (p < 0.001; Table 1) 
and a reliable two-way interaction between condition and word type (p < 0.001; Table 1). 
Follow-up tests revealed that the main effect of word type was reliable in the instructed 
condition (p < 0.001): error rates were higher for the 80%-stop words (0.11) than for the 0%-
stop words (0.07), t(59) = 4.73, p < 0.001, gav = 0.53, BF10 = 1289.83, and for the 20%-stop 
words (0.07), t(59) = 4.88, p < 0.001, gav = 0.51, BF10 = 2113.55. There was no reliable 
difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words, t(59) = -0.44, p = 0.661, gav = 
-0.03, BF10 = 0.15. There was a similar numerical trend in the uninstructed condition (Figure 
4, right panel), but there was no reliable main effect of word type (all p = 0.204) so pairwise 
comparisons between word types were not conducted.
There was a small but statistically significant difference between the no-distractor trials 
and the distractor trials (p = 0.001; Table 1). This effect did not interact with condition. The 
three-way interaction between word type, condition, and distractor was also not significant. 
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Figure 4: The probability of incorrect go responses for the instructed condition (left panels) 
and for the uninstructed condition as a function of part (1-3), word type (0%-stop, 20%-stop 
or 80%-stop words) and distractor type (distractor, no-distractor). Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Signal analyses. Analyses of the probability of responding on stop-signal trials revealed, 
as predicted, a main effect of word type (20% vs. 80% words), p < 0.001 (Figure 5; Table 3). 
There was also a reliable two-way interaction between condition and word type (p < 0.001; 
Table 3) reflecting the larger difference between the 80%-stop words and the 20%-stop words 
in the instructed condition than in the uninstructed condition (Figure 5). Follow-up tests 
revealed that p(respond|signal) was lower for the 80%-stop words than for the 20%-stop 
words in the instructed condition (80%-stop words: 0.36, 20%-stop words: 0.47; t(59) = 
-9.86, p < 0.001, gav = -1.41, BF10 = 170072648038) and in the uninstructed condition (80%-
stop words: 0.43, 20%-stop words: 0.46; t(59) = -3.55, p = 0.001, gav = -0.57, BF10 = 34.31). 
Thus, consistent with our hypothesis stopping benefited from the stimulus-stop associations 
in the instructed and uninstructed conditions. Furthermore, the SSD values were similar for 
the 80%-stop and 20%-stop words (for descriptive statistics, see Supplementary Materials) 
due to the yoked tracking procedure (for details see Procedure). Thus, the difference in 
p(respond|signal) was not due to differences in the SSD. 
Despite the separate tracking procedures, p(respond|signal) was lower on no-distractor 
trials than on distractor trials (p < 0.001; Table 3). This is consistent with our previous study 
which showed that distractors had a large effect on reactive inhibition (Verbruggen, Stevens, 
et al., 2014). Importantly, there was no reliable two-way interaction between word type and 
distractor type (interaction effect: p = 0.947, Table 3), and follow-up tests showed that the 
presence of distractors increased p(respond|signal) in the instructed condition (no-distractor: 
0.40, distractor: 0.43; t(59) = 3.49, p = 0.001, gav = 0.31, BF10 = 29.10) and in the uninstructed 
condition (no-distractor: 0.43, distractor: 0.46; t(59) = 3.52, p = 0.001, gav = 0.45, BF10 = 
31.45). The two-way interaction between part and distractor type was reliable (p < 0.001; 
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Table 3); presumably, the separate tracking procedures were slowly ‘catching up’, reducing 
the distractor difference over blocks.
Figure 5: The probability of responding on stop-signal trials for the instructed condition (left 
panels) and for the uninstructed condition (right panels) as a function of part (1-3), word type 
(0%-stop, 20%-stop or 80%-stop words) and distractor type (distractor, no-distractor). Error 
bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 3: Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the stop-signal data. 
Condition is included as a between-subjects factor, all other factors are within-subjects. 
Note:distract = distractor type; type = word type. αad = alpha-level following the sequential 
Bonferroni procedure to control for multiplicity. ps < αadj are highlighted in bold.
Expectancy analyses. Analyses of the expectancy data revealed a main effect of word 
type, F(2, 236) = 142.24, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.329 (Figure 6). There was also a reliable 
interaction between word type and condition, F(2, 236) = 65.15, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.183, 
indicating that the differences between the word types were larger in the instructed condition 
than in the uninstructed condition. 
Consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies, planned comparisons revealed that 
participants in the instructed condition expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words than for 
the 0%-stop words, t(59) = -12.98, p < 0.001, gav = 2.62, BF10 = 8.67e+15, and for the 20%-
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stop words, t(59) = -11.27, p < 0.001, gav = 2.35, BF10 = 2.56e+13 (Figure 6)5. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis. The difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop 
words in the instructed condition was also reliable, t(59) = -5.47, p < 0.001, gav = -0.46, BF10 
= 16531.78, mirroring a similar difference in the task performance data for RTs and errors on 
no-signal trials. In other words, extra learning occurred in the instructed condition. It is 
possible that informing participants in the instructed condition about the 80%-stop words 
influenced both the strength and/or quality of their knowledge representations regarding the 
existence of stimulus-stop contingencies in the task. Participants in the uninstructed condition 
also expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words than for the 0%-stop words, t(59) = -4.26, 
p < 0.001, gav = 0.50, BF10 = 287.76, and for the 20%-stop words, t(59) = -4.01, p < 0.001, gav 
= 0.44, BF10 = 131.546. The difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words in 
the uninstructed condition was not reliable, t(59) = -1.03, p = 0.307, gav = -0.09, BF10 = 0.23. 
Thus, participants in both conditions could distinguish between the 80%-stop words and the 
other word types on the basis of their association with stopping.
5 In the Instructed condition, 97% of participants expected to stop more for the 80%-stop 
words than for the 0%-stop words and 90% of participants expected to stop more for the 
80%-stop words than for the 20%-stop words (90% expected to stop more for the 80%-stop 
items than the 0%-and 20%-stop words). 
6 In the uninstructed condition, 67% of participants expected to stop more for the 80%-stop 
words than for the 0%-stop words and 70% of participants expected to stop more for the 
80%-stop words than for the 20%-stop words (48% expected to stop more for the 80%-stop 
items than the 0%-and 20%-stop words). 
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Figure 6: Expectancy ratings for the instructed condition (left panels) and for the uninstruc-
ted condition (right panels) as a function of word type (0%-stop, 20%-stop or 80%-stop 
words). Note: 1 = 'I definitely do not think this word indicates that I have to withhold my 
response'; 9 = 'I definitely think this word indicates that I have to withhold my response'. Error 
bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Next we investigated the relationship between the expectancy ratings and task perform-
ance (Figure 7). In the instructed condition, as predicted, the 80% vs. 0%-stop expectancy 
difference reliably correlated with the corresponding RT difference, r(58) = 0.548, p < 0.001; 
similarly, the 80% vs. 20%-stop expectancy difference reliably correlated with the corres-
ponding RT difference, r(58) = 0.524, p < 0.001. In the uninstructed condition, again as 
predicted, both correlations were not significant (rs ≤ -0.09, ps ≥ 0.501; note that uncorrected 
ps are reported). To investigate whether the correlations in the instructed and uninstructed 
conditions were statistically different, we compared the correlation coefficients in the 
instructed and uninstructed conditions using the Fisher's r-to-z transformation. This con-
firmed that the difference between the instructed and uninstructed conditions was reliable for 
the 80% vs. 0%-stop correlations (Z = 3.59, p < 0.001) and for the 80% vs. 20%-stop 
INSTRUCTED AND ACQUIRED CONTINGENCIES 35
correlations (Z = 3.58, p < 0.001). To quantify the evidence in favour of the null hypothesis 
(of no relationship) and of the alternative hypothesis (of a relationship), we also conducted 
Bayesian regression analyses. These analyses supported the null hypothesis that the expect-
ancy ratings did not correlate with the RT slowing in the uninstructed condition (BF 80%- vs. 
0%-stop words: 0.28; BF 80%- vs. 20%-stop words: 0.32), whereas the same analyses 
supported the alternative hypothesis for the instructed analysis (BF 80%- vs. 0%-stop words: 
2701.52; BF 80%- vs. 20%-stop words: 1023.85). 
Inspection of Figure 7 shows that the difference between these correlations is unlikely to 
be entirely due to differences in the range of the RT and/or expectancy values between the 
instructed and uninstructed conditions. However, to test this possibility further, we excluded 
RT-difference scores (and corresponding expectancy-difference scores) in the instructed 
condition that were less than or greater than the lowest and highest RT difference scores, 
respectively, in the uninstructed condition. There were 44 participants remaining for the 80% 
vs. 0%-stop correlation and 46 participants for the 80% vs. 20%-stop correlation. Neverthe-
less, the observed correlations in the instructed condition remained reliable and the Bayes 
Factors showed substantial support for the alternative hypothesis (rs ≥ 0.385, ps ≤ 0.010, BFs 
≥ 4.99). Furthermore, this difference cannot be easily explained by the differences in the 
acquisition rates of the stimulus-stop contingencies between the instructed and uninstructed 
conditions; RT/expectancy correlations performed on only part 3 (i.e. the final part of 
training) showed a similar pattern as the aforementioned correlations with all parts of training 
included. In the instructed condition, we found that the 80% vs. 0%-stop expectancy 
difference reliably correlated with the corresponding RT difference, r(58) = 0.419, p < 0.001; 
similarly, the 80% vs. 20%-stop expectancy difference reliably correlated with the corres-
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ponding RT difference, r(58) = 0.341, p = 0.008. In the uninstructed condition, all correla-
tions were not significant (ps ≥ 0.223). Thus, it seems that although the behavioural effects 
are the same (i.e. response slowing for stop-associated words), there is good evidence that the 
underlying mechanisms are somewhat different for the instructed and uninstructed 
conditions. 
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Figure 7: Expectancy/RT correlations for the 80%-stop and 0%-stop words (upper panels) and the 80%-stop and 20%-stop words (lower panels) 
for the instructed condition (left panels) and for the uninstructed condition (right panels). The correlations in the instructed condition were 
reliable (ps ≤ 0.001) but the correlations in the uninstructed condition were not reliable (ps ≥ 0.501).
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General Discussion
Responding is typically slowed for items that were previously associated with stopping. This 
slowing has been attributed to the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations which ‘directly’ 
activate the stop goal/response and slow responding on no-signal trials. Thus, learning could 
reduce the need for reactive and instruction-based control in response-inhibition tasks as the 
stop process could be activated before an extra signal is presented (Verbruggen, Best, et al., 
2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). However, in some recent experiments we found that 
slowing for old stop words was mediated by expectancies of the stimulus-stop contingencies 
acquired during training (Best et al., 2016). Previous work has demonstrated that when an 
instructional cue [e.g. ‘p(stop-signal) = .75’] indicates that a stop signal is likely to occur on 
the following trial(s), participants slow down by proactively adjusting their processing 
strategies (for reviews, see e.g. Aron, 2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2017). Therefore, if 
participants use stop-associated items as similar cues, slowing for old stop-associated words 
could reflect proactive (anticipatory) strategy adjustments driven by expectancies of the 
stimulus-stop contingencies in play rather than some more direct activation of the stop 
process. In the present study we aimed to test this hypothesis using a combination of an 
instruction and distractor manipulation. We also measured expectancy ratings following task 
completion (as in our previous study; Best et al., 2016). 
Similarities between the instructed and uninstructed conditions
Consistent with our predictions, our results show that the stimulus-stop contingencies 
influenced task performance in both the instructed and the uninstructed conditions: RTs on 
no-signal trials were higher and p(respond|signal) was lower for the stop-associated words 
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(80%-stop) than for the go-associated (0%-stop) words and for the control (20%-stop) words. 
Consistent with our instruction manipulation and predictions, the effects of word type on 
performance were greater in the instructed condition (where participants were told before-
hand which words would likely be associated with a stop signal) than in the uninstructed 
condition (where participants received no such information). This difference remained 
relatively stable over time, as indicated by the absence of a three-way interaction between 
part, word type, and condition. 
Participants in both conditions also generated expectancies that were consistent with 
the stimulus-stop contingencies in play: they expected to stop their responses more when 
stop-associated words were presented than when go-associated or control words were 
presented. 
Combined, these results suggest that stimulus-stop associations acquired primarily 
through explicit instructions and uninstructed stimulus-stop associations acquired primarily 
through task practice have similar effects on task performance (i.e. both induce slowing on 
no-signal trials and reduce the probability of responding on stop-signal trials). However, the 
effects are much stronger when the stop contingencies are instructed.
The overlap between the instructed and uninstructed conditions is consistent with previous 
work that has demonstrated that key areas of the instruction-based inhibitory control network 
are activated following the presentation of old stop-associated items (e.g. Lenartowicz et al., 
2011). Furthermore, it has been argued that despite the differences in learning speed, similar 
learning mechanisms may underlie instruction- or rule-based behavior and stimulus-response 
link-based behaviour (e.g. Pfeuffer, Hosp, Kimmig, Moutsopoulou, Waszak, & Kiesel, 2017; 
Pfeuffer, Moutsopoulou, Pfister, Waszak, & Kiesel, 2017; Pfeuffer, Moutsopoulou, Waszak, 
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& Kiesel, 2018; Ramamoorthy & Verguts, 2012; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Given 
this overlap between instruction- and practice-based inhibition, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
we find similarities between the two conditions in the present study. 
Differences between the instructed and uninstructed conditions
Despite the overlap, it is noteworthy that extra practice did not reduce the difference between 
the two conditions. Thus, the difference between the instructed and uninstructed condition 
may not be (only) due to slower learning rates in the latter. Indeed, we also found some other 
differences between the instructed and uninstructed conditions. In the instructed condition, 
participants were slower to respond to the 20%-stop words during task performance and 
expected to stop more to the 20%-stop words compared with the 0%-stop words. We found 
no reliable differences between the 20%- and 0%-stop words in the uninstructed condition. 
This suggests that instructing the participants about the 80%-stop words influenced their 
meta-knowledge about the existence of stimulus-stop contingencies in the task and encour-
aged them to look for others (“I know there are words often paired with the stop-signal – it 
might be good to search for other structures in the task material as well”, cf. Gaschler et al., 
2014), alongside influencing their knowledge about specific 80%-stop words (“I know that 
this word is often paired with stop”).
Furthermore, in the instructed condition, we found that the expectancy ratings correlated 
with task performance: participants who expected to withhold their response more for the 
80%-stop words responded more slowly to these words than to the 0%-stop words and to the 
20%-stop words. In contrast, the expectancy ratings in the uninstructed condition did not 
reliably correlate with task performance. This conclusion was further supported by Bayesian 
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regression analyses. In other words, participants could generate expectancies (at least at the 
end of the experiment), but these expectancies did not seem to influence task performance. 
In Best et al. (2016), we also found a correlation between slowing and expectancy ratings, 
even though all stimulus-stop mappings were uninstructed. As noted in the Introduction, 
correlations between expectancy ratings and performance are consistent with the idea that 
slowing reflects proactive-strategy adjustments, whereas the absence of a correlation is more 
consistent with the idea that the retrieval of stop associations directly interferes with 
responding. Differences in task characteristics (e.g. in Best et al., we used a hybrid go/no-go 
task whereas we used a stop-signal task in the present study) could have influenced what was 
learned and how the acquired associations influenced subsequent performance in our two 
studies. It is also possible, however, that expectancies simply constitute a measure of the 
strength of stimulus-stop learning on performance, in which case the difference between 
studies is quantitive (i.e. the amount of learning) rather than qualitative (strategy adjustments 
vs. direct activation). 
It is also important to note that the association between expectancies and task performance 
was correlational and not causal. To establish a causal role of explicit expectancies and to 
further disentangle contributions of expectancies and learning in response-inhibition tasks, 
future research could, for example, instruct expectations that do not fully match with the 
contingencies in the task material (Biele, Rieskamp, Gonzalez, 2009; Doll, Jakobs, Sanfey, 
Frank, 2009; Umbach, Schwager, Frensch, & Gaschler, 2012).
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No interactions with the distractor effect
In Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014), expectancy was manipulated in a block-based fashion 
(i.e. participants were informed at the beginning of a block if signals could occur in the 
periphery or in the centre of the screen), and proactive-control adjustments increased the 
distractor effect in RTs on no-signal trials. We used the same distractor manipulation in the 
present study to distinguish the roles of strategic control and direct retrieval (of the stimulus-
stop associations) in a stop-learning task. Consistent with Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014), 
we predicted that participants in instructed condition would proactively adjust their attention 
when presented with 80%-stop words; consequently, the distractor effect would be larger for 
the 80%-stop words compared with the other word types. Furthermore, if participants in the 
uninstructed condition similarly used the 80%-stop words as cues to elicit proactive attention-
al control, we would see a larger distractor effect for these words emerge over task practice in 
this condition as well. In contrast, the ‘direct retrieval’ account predicted no change in the 
distractor effect across word types (if anything, the effect could become smaller because there 
is less need to monitor for stop signals if the word is highly predictive of a signal). Thus, we 
anticipated that the inclusion of the distractor manipulation would allow us to determine the 
involvement of strategic proactive control adjustments during stop learning. 
Contrary to our predictions, we found that word-specific stop learning did not interact 
with the distractor effect on no-signal RTs. Importantly, this was the case in both the 
instructed and uninstructed conditions (and in the uninstructed condition of an earlier pilot 
experiment; see Supplementary Materials). Here, we suggest three of the most plausible 
alternative explanations for the absence of an interaction between expectancy and the 
distractor manipulation in no-signal RTs. 
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First, it is possible that participants simply cannot adjust their attentional settings on a 
trial-by-trial basis (see Strayer & Kramer, 1994, for a similar idea). However, evidence in the 
task-switching literature has demonstrated that participants can reconfigure their attentional 
settings when a cue indicates that a task switch is required (e.g. Longman, Lavric, & Monsell, 
2013; Longman, Lavric, Munteanu, & Monsell, 2014; Rushworth, Passingham, & Nobre, 
2005). Furthermore, trial-by-trial changes in attentional settings were also observed in the 
proactive-inhibitory control study of Elchlepp et al. (2016). Combined, these findings 
indicate that trial-by-trial adjustments in attentional settings can be made (see also Verbrug-
gen & Logan, 2009a). 
Second, it is possible that in the previous study by Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014), the 
presence of distractors primarily interfered with the detection or analysis of the go words 
rather than response selection. In the original experiment, two words were presented and 
participants had to respond to the location of the natural item, whereas only one word was 
presented in the present study. Thus, the attentional demands were higher in Verbruggen, 
Stevens, et al. (2014).
Third, we should also consider the possibility that the increased distractor effect in non-
central signal blocks reported by Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014) reflects a ‘false positive’. 
After we failed to observe an increased distractor effect in the instructed condition of the 
present study, we ran a further (unpublished) experiment with two words per trial. There were 
‘pure’ blocks in which the location of the signal stayed the same (non-central signal blocks, 
central signal blocks, and no-signal blocks as in Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. 2014) and 
‘mixed’ blocks in which the location of the signal changed on a trial-by-trial basis. In both 
block types, the location of the upcoming signal was instructed by way of a cue presented at 
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the beginning of each trial. We did not find any differences in the size of the distractor effect 
across the signal locations in the pure blocks or in the mixed blocks. One possibility is that 
the presentation of the cue on each trial encouraged participants to attend to the centre of the 
screen in that experiment. Alternatively, it could be that attentional adjustments, if made, do 
not reliably increase the distractor effect in this stop-signal task after all. 
We cannot currently distinguish between the different explanations, so future research is 
required here. Note that the present study found effects of distractors on reactive inhibition 
(as indexed by p(respond|signal)). We also replicated the distractor effect on reactive stopping 
in another recent study (Dodds et al., In Preparation). Thus, we consistently replicated the 
reactive inhibition part of the Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014) findings. This difference 
between reactive and proactive inhibition is not surprising, as distractors had a much larger 
effect on reactive control than proactive control in the original study (Verbruggen, Stevens, et 
al., 2014). To detect attentional strategy adjustments, more sensitive measures might be 
needed (such as EEG; see Elchlepp et al., 2016; Schevernels et al., 2015). 
Conclusion
In conclusion, these results suggest that slowing for stimuli that are consistently associated 
with stopping can arise from both instructed and acquired mappings. Given that we found 
effects of the stimulus-stop contingencies on expectancies in both the instructed and 
uninstructed conditions, the most parsimonious explanation would be to argue that explicit 
knowledge is required to observe response slowing for old stop items. However, Bayesian 
analyses showed that expectancies correlated with response slowing on no-signal trials in the 
instructed condition but not in the uninstructed condition. Thus, the present study provides 
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some evidence that stimulus-stop learning may well be mediated via both expectancies and 
information acquired via experience.
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